Monthly Archives: January 2013


The notion of nothing is a rather young concept in the history of human ideas. This may be due to the apparent inability to observe the absence of everything. In mathematics, for example, Babylonian scholars first had to invent a representation for the absence of a counter, thereby laying the foundation for the number zero as used today. As a number, zero is conceptually different from other numbers, since it cannot be represented by any describable physical entity. Socially, this has been made possible by the function of negation, which allows us to state that there is something, e.g. a section of a row on an abacus, which can and often does hold counters, but in this specific observation does not. This absence is then the core of this very observation, and it serves functionally as the equivalent of zero. In fact, the number zero can be seen as a shorthand for the observation above.

This shows that it is indeed possible and, with the benefit of hindsight, relatively easy to observe an absence inside a system. All it takes is a technical abstraction of some system of observations, such as counting, and then a reference to the substrate of the system, e.g. the abacus, to show and make explicit where elements are absent. This notion of absence is, however, quite different from the notion of nothing.

In nothingness, absence cannot be made explicit by referencing a substrate, for if there were a substrate, there would not be nothing. The trick how communication deals with nothingness is recontextualization: Nothing then has a semantic boundary, so that there is a system of meaning from which nothing can be observed.

Nothing in the world.

Nothing in the world.

The holistic view of an all-encompassing nothing uses the same function, when it describes the world as the inside of nothing, nothing coming into existence.

The world inside nothing.

The world inside nothing.

With this in mind, observations become non-materialistic, as it is clear that there is no qualitative difference between something and nothing, no substrate to provide a grounding. Rather, nothing and some existence are an oscillatory state, where any side inevitably invokes the other.


Self and External Reference

Sociological systems theory has established a clear distinction between self reference and external reference. Self reference is the ability of an observer to refer to himself in an observation, while external reference means establishing a relation to another identity distinct from the observer. Self reference invokes the notion of self in the world, and especially the handling of self reference and external reference within one observation is considered an important ability enabling the observer to deal with complexity arising from double contingency.

Looking at the concepts of self reference and external reference in the light of the descriptions of observations we worked out in the previous posts, the intrinsic availability of self reference has to be questioned. If we take any one observer as identical with one and only one observation, and view the notion of unity as a construction coming in after the fact of the actual observation, then we would have to place the idea of self reference also in this realm of constructions coming after the fact. If no two observers are  the same, then self reference is excluded, at least at this basic level. Here, all references are necessarily external, as no other identity can be the same as the actual observer. Even if the same reference were used, it would necessarily refer to a different observation that happened previously or will happen later.

The consideration of constructions coming after the actual observation has been theorized in the concept of second-order observations. These are defined as observations of observations, and they therefore come with the ability to create new contexts for other observations. Such a context can then be a notion of observer unity, i.e. selfhood. It can just as well include the actualization and reconstruction of another identity, such as a separate person. For a persistent notion of selfhood, it would be essential for both modes of observation to closely relate to each other, thus enabling a coherent construction of self reference. At the same time, any second-order observation is also a first-order observation, in that it also has its own unique observer, who can, at its own basic level, only make external references. These can, however, be constructions of self reference for another, external observation.